We quantify the temperature dependence of forced outages for six generator types. • Generator transition probabilities are modeled using logistic regression. • Nonhomogeneous Markov models capture observed correlated generator failures. • Resource adequacy can be improved by accounting for temperature dependence.
Introduction
Grid planners procure enough electric power generation to meet predicted demand and reserve generation to cover the statistical chance that one or more generators will fail. The process of determining how much generation to procure is called resource adequacy modeling (RAM). It is well known that severe environmental conditions can lead to elevated failure probabilities for power system components [1] [2] [3] . PJM, a large system operator in the USA, documents generator outage rates three times the historical winter average during the January 2014 Polar Vortex event [2] ; and generator outage rates nearly twice the historical winter average during a milder cold snap that occurred in January 2018 [3] . Yet most current approaches to resource adequacy modeling are unable to account for these risks because they treat generators as homogeneous Markov models (i.e., having time-invariant transition probabilities) [1, [4] [5] [6] [7] . 1 This assumption is inconsistent with results from recent empirical work using four years of Generating Availability Data System (GADS) data from the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) that demonstrated the existence of correlated failures in most NERC reliability regions [8] . The correlated failures demonstrated in [8] are consistent with a numerical example presented by Gaver et al. [1] that shows much higher reliability adverse effects under adverse weather conditions. The observation that generators fail simultaneously leaves open the question of how to model correlated failures and recoveries. simultaneously is one possible explanation of these results.
Here we test this possibility with a time-varying (nonhomogeneous) Markov model fit using 23 years of data for 1845 generators in the USA's largest electricity market. The nonhomogeneous Markov model's probabilities of transitioning, e.g. from fully available to partially or fully derated, depend on exogenous variables such as temperature and system load (the electric energy being used by customers). Many factors could affect transition probabilities. However, if failures (transitions from working to not working) depend on variables that are jointly experienced by many generators, such an approach could capture the observed correlated failures. Understanding the causes of correlated failures and recoveries can help in the procurement of reserves, payments for which amount to billions of dollars per year in the USA [9] .
Markov models are widely used in power system reliability analyses. The traditional two-state model assumes generators are either fully available or fully unavailable [10, 11] . Common generalizations allow additional states [12] , different two-state models over a discrete set of environments: e.g. "normal weather" versus "adverse weather" [1, [13] [14] [15] , or generator "in demand" versus "not in demand" [16] [17] [18] . Billinton and Bollinger [13] derive steady-state probability distributions for one-, two-, and three-line transmission systems. Liu and Singh [14] use Bayesian networks to study common-cause and independent failures due to hurricanes in a composite power system. Billinton and Li [15] allow segments of a single transmission line to experience different weather states so as to not over-estimate failure bunching in power systems that cover large geographic areas. Bhavaraju et al. [16] use a generalizable multi-state homogeneous Markov model to develop steady-state probability distributions for peaking generators; Billinton and Chowdhury [17] employ a three-state model. An IEEE task group [18] describes multiple models incorporating "in demand" versus "not in demand" states to improve upon the traditional two-state models for estimating the probability of being unavailable when needed by the system for peaking generators.
Particularly with respect to transmission and distribution system reliability, there has been significant scholarly attention to the effects of extreme weather and natural disasters [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] . Bramer et al. [19] develop penalized logistic regression models to predict grid stress as a function of a suite of weather variables in the eastern USA. Li et al. [20] evaluates the hazard effects of wind storms on distribution systems in the northeastern USA using multiple metrics including system average interruption frequency index (SAIFI), system average interruption duration index (SAIDI), and expected energy not supplied (EENS). Bernstein et al. [21] develop a cascading transmission line outage model that allows for non-proximate line failures using the network topology of the western USA. Panteli and Mancarella [22] use a sequential Monte Carlo simulation-based time series simulation model to capture the effect of weather dependent failure probabilities on a sixbus system. Wei et al. [23] model distribution failures in the eastern USA during Hurricane Ike using a Poisson process estimated using observed failure data.
Homogeneous Markov models are most commonly employed, which means that transition probabilities are constant [10, 24] . To model correlated failures, a new state must be created for each combination of generators failing simultaneously [25] [26] [27] ; the state space therefore grows geometrically as the number of generators increases. While this approach can be successfully used to model multiple generators in a power plant or a small number of transmission lines, the intractability of applying it to a fleet of generators in a large power system has led researchers to define states in terms of system capabilities or to merge states [28, 29] . Hou et al. [29] use a continuous time Markov chain where higher-order outage states are merged to improve tractability of a bottom-up reliability assessment of a composite generation and transmission power system. Felder [28] instead proposes a top-down model where system states are defined based on system capabilities rather than component states. Computing transition probabilities that depend on variables such as temperature and load to capture correlated failures can require long time series of generator-level data; these data were not previously available.
Using these generator-level data, we model each generator with only two states, but allow transition probabilities to depend on exogenous variables such as temperature. Similar approaches have been employed to study distribution and transmission system reliability [23, [30] [31] [32] , but to our knowledge none have been used to study correlated generator failures in a large power system. Andreasson [30] examines the implications of correlated transmission line failures for risk of load shed to a 470-bus model of the Nordic power system. Wang et al. [31] allow failure rates of transmission lines to vary by season to account for failures caused by meteorological events. Ertekin et al. [32] model distribution system failures in New York City as a nonhomogeneous Poisson process accounting for maintenance and other line features. To conduct this analysis we create hourly time series of transitions for 1845 generators in the eastern USA using 23 years of GADS data from the PJM Interconnection (PJM), the largest electric power market in the USA. For each generator, the two-state Markov model's time-varying probabilities are modeled as functions of exogenous variables using logistic regression. We model transition probabilities as a function of temperature and system load, though the model can be extended to include additional covariates. Both temperature and load vary with time and are jointly experienced by many generators, thus transition probabilities in generators' Markov chains can be correlated.
Model
We use logistic regression to model each generator's transition probabilities as a function of covariates. We fit these models using the GLM library in R, with default initial values. While there are many binary classification algorithms, logistic regression is relatively insensitive to unbalanced data [33] . This is an important attribute for this analysis, as most generators fail infrequently. Unbalanced data makes accurately estimating transition probabilities more difficult [34] .
We employ a two-state Markov model wherein each generator is treated as either fully available (subsequently referred to as available and abbreviated A) or at least partially unavailable (subsequently referred to as derated and abbreviated D). For each generator we separately model two pairs of transition probabilities: the probability of an available generator remaining available in the next hour versus becoming derated (failing), and the probability of a derated generator remaining derated in the next hour versus becoming available (recovering).
As in [32] , we allow transition probabilities to be a function of covariates. We consider temperature and load because they have time series dependence and affect multiple generators simultaneously. As a result, if they are found to have statistically significant associations with changes in transition probabilities, our model may be able to explain the correlated failures identified in [8] . If no covariates are statistically significant, this model reduces to the familiar homogeneous (time-invariant) Markov model of [11] (Fig. 1 ). Our modeling approach therefore allows us to relax the assumptions of unconditional independence and constant generator availability where empirically warranted. It instead assumes that generator transitions are conditionally independent (after conditioning on relevant covariates) and allows generator availability to vary over time.
We fit our models using maximum likelihood estimation (iteratively reweighted least squares). Consistency and asymptotic normality of our coefficient estimates flow from traditional maximum likelihood estimation theory, which holds in our setting because all covariates are bounded [35] . The estimation procedure is conducted on each generator, using its hourly series of Markov state transitions and covariate data, described below. If the transition probabilities were constant, this would be equivalent to determining the probability of a coin coming up heads. The likelihood functions are:
where β A and β D are vectors of parameters for the available and derated models, respectively; Q i is the probability of the generator remaining available in the next hour when it is currently available; P i is the probability of the generator remaining derated in the next hour when it is currently derated; count(A) is the number of observations used to fit the available model; count(D) is the number of observations used to fit the derated model; α i = 1 if the ith available observation is AA and 0 otherwise; δ i = 1 if the ith derated observation is DD and 0 otherwise; and the sum of count(A) and count(D) equals the number of Markov state transitions in the reporting period for the generator. The available and derated models are fit separately for each generator (Fig. 2) . A generator's hourly states are independent and identically distributed conditional on the covariate values; dependence in the covariate values leads to a richer time series structure for the generator's observations. We allow Q i and P i to be functions of covariates while still ensuring all transition probabilities are bounded by [0,1] by employing the logistic function:
where X i is a vector of covariate observations in hour i, with as many elements as the number of constants and covariates in the model. We consider the following model specification for both available and derated models for each generator: , system_load i is the load residual in hour i, constant_hot i = 1 if temperature_cool i = 0 (and 0 otherwise), constant_cool i = 1 if temperature_cool i > 0 (and 0 otherwise), and temperature i is the temperature in hour i, reported in degrees Celsius. 2 This specification allows for an asymmetric response to hot and cold temperature. So that our model can better generalize to temperatures and loads not observed in the data, we employ stepwise regression (backward elimination) as described in Procedure 1, selecting a significance sponds to the demarcation point used to define heating degree days and cooling degree days in the USA by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration [49] . It also corresponds to the flattest region of the temperature-load relationship in the PJM area found by [50] . level of 0.05. To reduce bias, we then eliminate any generator having fewer than 10 DA or AD transitions per statistically significant model covariate [36] Procedure 2 simulates time series of unavailable capacity for each generator according to the hourly failure and recovery probability distributions defined by the historical series of covariate values. Any hour that was ignored when fitting a generator's available or derated model is set to zero in both the empirical and simulated series. In order to have a true out-of-sample test of model performance, we refit the models using only 1995-2015 data (rather than 1995-2018) and retain just the 1047 generators that have sufficient transitions over the shortened time series. This leaves 2016-2018 as test data. We carry out this procedure 5000 times and generate pointwise median and 95% confidence intervals from the result, which we plot along with the empirical time series ( Fig. 4 ). Given the data limitations discussed in . For reference, we report annual installed capacity values for these generators (Table A.1 and Table B .1).
Procedure 2 (Simulating unavailable capacity from nonhomogeneous Markov models).
For each simulation, do: 
Simulating unavailable capacity from time-invariant (homogeneous) Markov models per current RAM practice
We compute the equivalent forced outage factor (EFOF 5 ), a common availability statistic, as follows [37] :
where FOH (forced outage hours) is the sum of hours where the generator experiences a forced outage, EFDH (equivalent forced derating hours) is the sum of hours where the generator experiences a forced derating, reported in full-outage-equivalent hours, and PH (period hours) is the total number of hours in the period of interest. In accord with current RAM practice, we define the period supporting each planning year as the preceding five calendar years. For consistency with 5 More commonly, the equivalent forced outage rate (EFOR) is used [37] .
where SH (service hours) is the total number of hours the generator produces electricity, Synch is the number of hours the generator operates in synchronous condensing mode, Pump is the number of hours a pumped-storage hydroelectric generator operates in pumping mode, and EFDHRS (equivalent forced derating hours during reserve shutdown) is the number of hours the generator experiences a forced derating during a reserve shutdown event, reported in fulloutage-equivalent hours [39] . However, using EFOF allows us to not worry about incomplete reporting of reserve shutdown events prior to 2004. the logistic regression results, we carry out the procedure for the 1047 generators retained when fitting models on 1995-2015 data and we ignore contributions to FOH and EFDH that occur during any hour removed during model fitting.
Procedure 3 (Simulating unavailable capacity from homogeneous Markov models).
Define duration of data period supporting each planning year (e.g. 5 years)For each simulation, do: 
GADS data description
The GADS database records availability and design information for all generators serving the PJM control area, with the exception of wind, solar, and behind-the-meter generation. Reporting to GADS is mandatory, regardless of generator size [38] . We work primarily with the Events, Units, and Performance tables. The Events table reports any event affecting the ability of a generator to produce electricity, as well as other event types defined by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standard 762 [37] . The Units table reports design details of each generator, such as generator type and nameplate capacity. 6 The Performance table reports monthly summary statistics of each generator's operating and non-operating time. We analyze data from January 1, 1995 (database inception) through March 31, 2018. Over this period 1845 generators representing 267 GW (GW) of capacity have reported to GADS.
GADS data processing

Obtaining time series of availability state transitions
PJM's GADS database is virtually identical to that of NERC (albeit covering many more years), thus we prepare it for analysis as described in [8] . We calculate the magnitude of each derating event and then process events into time series of unavailable capacity. We restrict each generator's time series to complete calendar years. We then use each generator's time series of unavailable capacity to define a corresponding time series of hour-over-hour Markov state transitions (Fig. 2) . For example, an AA transition occurs when the generator is available in two adjacent hours.
Determining when a generator is available to transition
Our model assumes each generator is able to transition out of its current state in each hour (i.e., the generator can experience a failure if it is currently available and recover if currently derated). We attempt to exclude hours in which this assumption is violated in order to minimize bias. When fitting the available model, we remove mothball, inactive reserve, and all scheduled outage events because the generator cannot be operating when these events are underway [39] . The generator can still operate when a scheduled derating is in effect, so these hours are not removed.
When fitting the derated model, we remove only mothball and inactive reserve events. This is because no repair work is allowed to occur when these events are in progress [39] . Repair work on unscheduled failures can occur during scheduled outage and scheduled derating events, so these hours are not removed. In addition, some failures are catastrophic and take many months to repair. Including these events would bias recovery probabilities downward. To correct for this, we remove hours when a generator remains in the derated state without interruption for more than six months.
Calculating the average derating magnitude for each generator
Because derating magnitudes can take any value up to a generator's nameplate capacity, but our model allows only one derated state, we calculate the average failure magnitude for each generator (Fig. A.1 ). We calculate this as a duration-weighted average of all unscheduled events experienced by the generator, excluding any hour removed when fitting either the available or derated model. The average and median failure magnitudes are 78% and 96% of nameplate capacity, respectively.
A note on reserve shutdown events
Reserve shutdown events are used to indicate when a generator is offline for economic reasons but is capable of coming online within its normal startup time if needed. With the exception of hydroelectric and pumped storage generators without automatic reporting equipment, all conventional generators participating in the PJM market became obligated to report reserve shutdown events to GADS in January 2004, nine years after the beginning of our data.
When a reserve shutdown event is underway, a generator should neither be in service nor have repair work conducted. If one assumes that the incidence of a failure while a generator is not operating and not being repaired is much lower than when operating or when being repaired, reserve shutdown hours should also be excluded from both available and derated model fits. However, given that most generators fail infrequently and that we require a minimum of 10 AD and DA transitions per statistically significant covariate to keep a generator in our analysis, eliminating the first nine years of data results in significantly fewer generators retained, particularly for CTs.
As a result, we fit our models twice: first using the full data period (1995-2018) ignoring reserve shutdown events, and second restricting to 2004-2018 and removing reserve shutdown hours from both available and derated model fits. Results based upon the former are presented in the main text and in Appendix A, while results based upon the latter are included in Appendix B. In general, we find reasonable agreement between the two sets of results.
Geographic, weather, and load data processing
Geocoding generators
To determine the location of each generator, we match the GADS data to the Emissions and Generation Resource Integrated Database (eGRID), maintained by the USA Environmental Protection Agency [40] [41] [42] [43] . This task was completed using a combination of automated and manual matching using generator names and other descriptive fields. We manually confirm each automated match and then associate the eGRID latitude/longitude data with the generator.
Weather station data
We obtain temperature data from the Global Surface Hourly database, maintained by the USA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration [44] . We include all weather stations active for the full study period in any state containing or adjacent to any generator. We process these data into hourly time series for each weather station by first rounding observations to the nearest hour and then removing observations with duplicate time stamps. We discard any weather station missing more than 100 sequential observations or more than 5000 total observations over the 23 years, with three exceptions to increase coverage in Pennsylvania. 7 We then fill missing observations by propagating forward the most recent non-missing observation. 8 Finally, we link each generator to its nearest weather station meeting our data criteria. We map the retained generators and matched weather stations ( Fig. 3 and Fig. B.2 ).
Load data
Finally we obtain hourly metered load data by PJM transmission zone for the full study period. We sum over all zones that have been part of the control area since January 1995 to develop an hourly load series for the system. 9 To account for non-stationarities in that series, we regress the load data on a constant, a linear time trend, and a quadratic time trend. The residuals from this linear regression are used as the load signal experienced by each generator. We plot the load time series with regression trend and residuals (Fig. A.2 and Fig. B.3 ).
Model significance summaries
When fitting models on the full dataset, we retain 1111 of 1845 generators, representing 78% of the capacity that has ever reported to GADS (Fig. A.3) ; when restricting to 2004-2018, we retain 748 generators representing 67% of capacity (Fig. B.4) . While failures and recoveries for the remaining generators may indeed be influenced by temperature and/or load, they have so few transitions that we would not have confidence in the fitted models. We summarize the count and capacity of these generators (Table A.2 and Table B .2).
We summarize marginal statistical significance of the covariates by plotting When fitting on the full dataset, linear and quadratic hot-temperature variables are statistically significant for 19% and 17% of (1), Texas (8). 7 These three stations had 268, 65, and 103 sequential missing observations and 2937, 8962, and 1370 total missing observations. 8 We initially filled missing observations by propagating forward the most recent non-missing observation at the same hour of the day, but discovered that several weather stations were systematically missing observations at particular times of the day over long durations.
generators' available models; linear and quadratic cold-temperature variables are statistically significant for 34% and 47% of generators' available models; and load is statistically significant for 64% of generators' available models. For the derated model, linear and quadratic hot-temperature variables are statistically significant for 23% and 20% of generators; linear and quadratic cold-temperature variables are statistically significant for 36% and 35% of generators; and load is statistically significant for 68% of generators. We summarize the joint statistical significance of model covariates by creating scatterplots of parameter t-values between all non-orthogonal covariate pairs, excluding constants (Figs. A.8-A.9 and Figs. B.9-B.10). 10 We observe systematic joint statistical significance between linear and quadratic temperature parameters in both sets of models, suggesting true temperature dependence rather than individual temperature parameters being significant by random chance. We include corresponding bivariate summaries of model coefficients ( We report the number of statistically significant parameters for each generator (Table A.3 and Table B .5). We report similar information when restricting attention to linear and quadratic temperature parameters (Table A.4 and Table B .6). When fitting on the full dataset, 69% of generators have at least one statistically significant temperature covariate for the available model; 67% do for the derated model. These results demonstrate that temperature and load can have independent effects on transition probabilities. Finally, we compactly summarize variation in model predictions over the experienced covariate observations for each generator (Supplementary materials Fig. A.12 and Fig. B.13 ).
Results
In the previous section, we demonstrate that temperature and load can predict state transitions at the generator level. We use Monte Carlo simulation to demonstrate that the models can also predict correlated failures (Procedure 2). Even with our simple model specification using only temperature and load as covariates, we find that the median simulation generally tracks the empirical time series quite well ( Fig. 4  and Fig B.1) . The correlation between weekly average median simulation values and weekly average empirical values is 0.47 and 0.67 over the training and testing periods, respectively, for the 1995-2015 model fits and 0.47 and 0.69 during training and testing periods for the 2004-2015 fits. The motivation for fitting models using two different time periods is explained in the previous section.
Furthermore, it is rare for an empirical event to exceed the upper confidence band of our model. The largest instances of under-prediction by our model occurred during two known events in which significant generator outages were due to causes not included as covariates: the 2014 Polar Vortex (due to fuel unavailability events, which increase non-linearly in cold weather) and Hurricane Sandy (an extreme weather event but not with regard to temperature). While many other factors may contribute to generator failures and recoveries [45] [46] [47] , these results demonstrate that temperature and load are strongly correlated with system-level unavailable capacity dynamics.
We next compare the performance of our model to that of current RAM practice. This entails computing an availability statistic for each generator in each planning year (Eq. (6)), and then using those statistics in Monte Carlo simulations (Procedure 3).
We plot the pointwise median and 95% confidence intervals from 5000 simulations of the current RAM practice (Fig. 5 ). As anticipated, the current practice approach does not capture correlated failures because the distribution of unavailable capacity is the same in every hour of a given planning year. The correlation between weekly average median simulation values and weekly average empirical values is 0.15 Fig. 5 . Weekly averages rather than hourly series. 5000 simulations conducted. Refer to Table A .1 for installed capacity by calendar year. Black trace is the empirical time series; blue trace is the concatenation of pointwise median simulation values; red traces are the concatenation of pointwise 2.5% and 97.5% simulation values.
Table 1
Number of times each model term is statistically significant at the 95% level for the available model (1995-2018 model fits). Only generators with at least 10 failure and recovery transitions per statistically significant model parameter are retained. CC is combined cycle, CT is simple cycle, DS is diesel, HD is hydroelectric and pumped storage, NU is nuclear, ST is steam turbine. over 18 years and 0.11 during the testing period. 11 In addition, the pointwise 95% confidence intervals are wider than those for our model, averaging 5% of installed capacity over 18 years compared to 3.1% of installed capacity for the logistic regression model. Comparing the two figures, we observe that the homogeneous Markov model simulating current RAM practice would both underprocure reserve generation for ∼10 events and over-procure reserves most of the time. That the nonhomogeneous model tracks observed failure dynamics substantially better than the current practice model suggests its potential utility both for improving the accuracy of RAM and for predicting correlated failures over time horizons relevant to procurement of operating reserves.
Resource adequacy risk as a function of temperature and load
We next examine resource adequacy risks for the fleet of generators in PJM. For fixed values of temperature and load, each generator's available and derated models imply a stationary distribution over the available and derated states. We make use of this fact to determine the proportion of the time each generator is unavailable in expectation. By calculating this result over a range of temperature values, we determine expected unavailable capacity as a function of temperature for the modeled fleet (Procedure 4). We determine the analogous result under current modeling practice by first computing an unconditional transition probability matrix for each generator using all available years of data and then following the remainder of the inner loop of Procedure 4. We present results by generator type (Fig. 6 and Fig. B.14) and report the prevalence of temperatures experienced by the fleet of modeled generators (Fig. A.13 and Fig. B.15 ).
With the exception of nuclear, all generator types perform worse in very cold weather than recognized under current modeling practice. This result is consistent with analysis conducted by PJM [2] . Poor coldweather performance is particularly pronounced for gas and diesel generators. In addition, all generator types perform worse in very hot weather than recognized under current practice. Because loads are high at both temperature extremes, the resource adequacy risk implied by these performance penalties is compounded: less generation capacity is available when demand is greatest. In power systems with organized forward-capacity markets, these temperature-dependent performance penalties could be used to improve capacity payments. Rather than use a generator's unconditional forced outage rate to determine capacity payments [48] , thereby penalizing the generator for its average unavailability, the grid planner could calculate a conditional forced outage rate during relevant extreme weather conditions that represent increased resource adequacy risk. Finally, we repeat the preceding analysis switching the role of temperature and load in order to visualize resource adequacy risk as a function of load. Because the relationship between load and unavailable capacity could be different at high and low temperatures, we generate two sets of results: one for observations where the temperature is below 18.3 degrees, and one for observations where temperature is above 18.3 degrees. With these modifications, we repeat Procedure 4. We again present results by generator type (Figs. A.14-A.15 and Figs. B.16-B.17) .
In Fig. A.14, at median temperature values, only coal generators at very high loads show noticeable divergence from the unconditional level of unavailable capacity. When considering low-percentile temperatures, gas and diesel generators also exhibit divergence from the unconditional result at higher loads. Nuclear generators show no load response for cold-temperature observations, regardless of load level or temperature quantile, consistent with Fig. 6. In Fig. A.15 , coal and nuclear generators diverge from their respective unconditional levels of unavailable capacity at high loads regardless of temperature percentile considered. Diesel generators show some divergence at very low loads. 
Discussion
We have presented a model of how correlated failures previously identified in the North American power system [8] can occur. Our approach is a novel, computationally tractable generalization of the traditional two-state Markov model widely used in power system reliability analyses [11] . We demonstrate a simple specification in which transition probabilities between the available and derated states are modeled as a function of temperature and load, but we note that any desired covariates could be employed.
We fit these models using logistic regression with 23 years of availability data for 1845 generators serving the PJM regional transmission organization. To reduce bias, we discard any generator with fewer than 10 failure or recovery events per statistically significant covariate. We retain 78% of the generation capacity that has ever reported to PJM GADS. We find that temperature and load can predict generator transitions: temperature and load are each statistically significant for two-thirds of the retained generators.
We demonstrate that our model specification captures most of the correlated failures observed in PJM since 2000 and that it significantly . Black dots calculated using median load from temperature neighborhood, red dots calculated using 90th percentile load from temperature neighborhood. Temperature neighborhood is defined as ± 10 degrees. Not all generators experience full temperature range; see Fig. A.13 for prevalence of temperatures. CC is combined cycle, CT is simple cycle, DS is diesel, HD is hydroelectric and pumped storage, NU is nuclear, ST is steam turbine.
outperforms the homogeneous Markov model underlying current resource adequacy modeling practice. The correlation of our median simulation with the observed series of unavailable capacity at the weekly level is 0.47 over 18 years, whereas that of the median simulation from current practice is 0.15. Our model also has narrower confidence intervals, averaging 3.1% of installed capacity compared to 5% for current practice.
Conclusions
We demonstrate that all generator types are susceptible to increased probability of failure at extreme temperatures. With the exception of nuclear generators, which have reduced availability during only hot weather, all generator types have reduced availability at both temperature extremes. The cold-weather penalty for gas and diesel generators is particularly pronounced, as is the hot-weather penalty for nuclear generators. These availability penalties, which represent temperature-dependent forced outage rates, could be used to determine capacity payments that better incentivize generators to be available during key times of grid stress. Finally, we demonstrate that nuclear and coal generators experience an availability penalty at high loads; for nuclear generators this penalty is present only in conjunction with high temperatures. These risks are not captured in current approaches to resource adequacy modeling.
Taken together, our results demonstrate that there are systematic relationships between temperature, load, and generator availability. Accounting for these relationships, as we have done here, is likely to enable more accurate determination of power system reserve capacity requirements. In particular, given that peak loads typically coincide with either very low or very high temperatures, the relationships we have identified suggest that current RAM practice may be underestimating power system reserve capacity requirements. Future work should examine the specific causes of the temperature dependence of generator availability and what improvements in reserves procurement can be achieved now that correlated failures can be successfully modeled.
Supplementary Materials:
A time-dependent model of generator failures and recoveries captures correlated events and quantifies temperature dependence Black dots computed at median temperature from load neighborhood; blue and red dots correspond to 10th and 90th percentile temperatures from load neighborhood, respectively. Load neighborhood defined analogously to temperature neighborhood of Figure 6 . Current practice dashed line matches that of Figure 6 . Plot domain defined using only observations below 18.3 degrees. CC is combined cycle, CT is simple cycle, DS is diesel, HD is hydroelectric and pumped storage, NU is nuclear, ST is steam turbine. Black dots computed at median temperature from load neighborhood; blue and red dots correspond to 10th and 90th percentile temperatures from load neighborhood, respectively. Load neighborhood defined analogously to temperature neighborhood of Figure 6 . Current practice dashed line matches that of Figure 6 . Plot domain defined using only observations above 18.3 degrees. CC is combined cycle, CT is simple cycle, DS is diesel, HD is hydroelectric and pumped storage, NU is nuclear, ST is steam turbine.
Appendix B: Figures and tables for 2004-2018 model fits
As discussed in Section 3.2.4 of the main text, there was incomplete reporting of reserve shutdown (RS) events to PJM GADS prior to 2004. RS events are used to indicate when a generator is offline for economic reasons rather than due to a failure event. If one assumes that the incidence of a failure while a generator is not operating and not being repaired is much lower than when operating or when being repaired, reserve shutdown hours should be excluded from both available and derated model fits. However, given that most generators fail infrequently and that we require a minimum of 10 AD and DA transitions per statistically significant covariate to keep a generator in our analysis, eliminating the first nine years of data results in significantly fewer generators retained. As a result, we fit our models twice: once using the full data reporting period for all generators (results presented in the main text and in Appendix A) and once discarding all data prior to 2004 (results presented here). Black dots calculated using median load from temperature neighborhood, red dots calculated using 90th percentile load from temperature neighborhood. Temperature neighborhood is defined as +/-10 degrees. Not all generators experience full temperature range; see Figure B .15 for prevalence of temperatures. CC is combined cycle, CT is simple cycle, DS is diesel, HD is hydroelectric and pumped storage, NU is nuclear, ST is steam turbine. 
